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Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the current farm economic downturn and credit
restructuring by comparing it with the 1920s and 1980s farm crises from both economic and regulatory
perspectives.
Design/methodology/approach This paper closely compares critical economic and regulatory aspects of the
current farm downturn with two previous farm crises in the 1920s and 1980s, and equally importantly, the
golden eras that occurred before them. This study compares key aggregate statistics in land value, agricultural
credit, lending regulations, and also evaluates the situations and impacts on individual farmer households by
using three representative case studies.
Findings The authors argue that there are at least three economic and regulatory reasons why the current farm
downturn is unlikely to slide into a sudden collapse of the agricultural markets: strong, real income; growth in
the 2000s, historically low interest rates; and more prudent agricultural lending practices. The current farm
downturn is more likely a liquidity and working capital problem, as opposed to a solvency and balance sheet
problem for the overall agricultural sector. The authors argue that the trajectory of the current farm downturn
will likely be a gradual, drawn-out one like that of the 1920s farm crisis, as opposed to a sudden collapse as in
the 1980s farm crisis.
Originality/value The review provides empirical evidence for cautious optimism of the future trajectory of the
current downturn, and argues that the current downturn is much more similar to the 1920s pattern than the
1980s crisis.
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Abstract 23 
Purpose – This paper examines the current farm economic downturn and credit restructuring by 24 
comparing it with the 1920s and 1980s farm crisis from both economic and regulatory perspectives.    25 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper closely compared critical economic and regulatory aspects 26 
of the current farm downturn with two previous farm crises in the 1920s and 1980s, and equally 27 
importantly, the golden eras that occurred before them. This study compares key aggregate statistics in 28 
land value, agricultural credit, lending regulations, and also evaluates the situations and impacts on 29 
individual farmer households by using several case studies.  30 
Findings – We argue that there are at least three economic and regulatory reasons why the current farm 31 
downturn is unlikely to slide into a sudden collapse of the agricultural markets: strong, real income 32 
growth in the 2000s, historically low interest rates, and more prudent agricultural lending practices. The 33 
current farm downturn is more likely a liquidity and working capital problem, as opposed to a solvency 34 
and balance sheet problem for the overall agricultural sector. We argue that the trajectory of the current 35 
farm downturn will likely be a gradual, drawn-out one like that of the 1920s farm crisis, as opposed to a 36 
sudden collapse as in the 1980s farm crisis. 37 
Originality/value – Our review provides empirical evidence for cautious optimism of the future 38 
trajectory of the current downturn, and argues that the current downturn is much more similar to the 39 
1920s pattern than the 1980s crisis. 40 
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Introduction 44 
If we define a “golden era” in agriculture as a period when the inflation-adjusted value of farmland 45 
significantly exceeds the 1910 level, we can argue that there have been three major golden eras in modern 46 
U.S. agriculture over the last 100 years: 1910 to 1920, 1973 to 1981, and most recently 2003 to 2013 47 
(Zhang, 2017; also see Figure 1). The most recent run was fueled by at least three factors: the value of 48 
China’s imports of U.S. agricultural products grew more than 400% from 2003 to 2013 (Gale et al., 49 
2014), for the first time the 10-year U.S. Treasury Constant Maturity rate dropped below 2% in 2011–50 
2013 (FRS, 2017), and finally, U.S. corn used for ethanol production increased from less than 12% in 51 
2003 to more than 37% in 2013 (US DOE, 2017). With the current monthly average cash corn prices 52 
received by Iowa farmers less than half of its August 2012 peak level of $6.89/bushel (Johanns 2017), and 53 
U.S. farm income and asset values declining correspondingly, many farmers and agricultural 54 
professionals worry about the current farm downturn deteriorating into another farm crisis (Gabriel, 55 
2017). As a result, it is critical to put today’s downturn into perspective by comparing across the previous 56 
boom-bust cycles of U.S. agriculture, especially the two previous golden eras and ensuing 1920s and 57 
1980s farm crises. 58 
      This article provides a timely general review that examines the current farm economic downturn 59 
through both an economic and regulatory lens and compares it with the 1920s and 1980s farm crises as 60 
well as the golden eras before them. In our review, we make use of both aggregate economic, legal and 61 
regulatory statistics on the agricultural sectors and agricultural credit conditions, and three representative 62 
case studies of farmer households, each of whom went through the three ups and downs in agriculture. In 63 
particular, for each golden era and ensuing farm downturn or crisis, we examine and compare trends in 64 
farm income, interest rates, as well as agricultural lending practices and regulations. In addition, we use 65 
three case studies of farmers who lived in the 1910s–1930s, 1970s–1980s and 2000s–2017 to showcase 66 
how the golden eras and farm downturns were manifested at the individual producer level. These 67 
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individual farmer case studies transform numbers on a page into real life, and could be used for extension 68 
publications and presentations. 69 
       We argue that despite the growing financial stress across the Midwest over the past few years 70 
(Plastina, 2016), we are unlikely to see a replay of 1980s farm crisis as evidenced by the sudden, 71 
precipitous collapse of the U.S. agricultural land market and mounting delinquent farm loans and 72 
foreclosures (Gabriel, 2017; Harl, 1990), nor a general economic crisis like the 1930s Great Depression. 73 
This somewhat optimistic outlook mainly stems from the strong farm income growth from 2003 to 2013 74 
(USDA ERS, 2017), the historically low interest rate environment (FRS, 2017), and more prudent 75 
agricultural lending practices (FRS, 2015). Instead, our review suggests that the trajectory of the current 76 
farm downturn will likely be a gradual, drawn-out one like that of the 1920s farm crisis, as opposed to a 77 
sudden collapse as in the 1980s farm crisis. This rests on two important distinctions: first, the inflation-78 
adjusted net farm income rose in the golden era and then declined in the downturn period for both the 79 
current downturn and the 1910s–1920s period, while the real net farm income dropped in the 1970s due to 80 
the high inflation and then shot up shortly in the mid-1980s. Second, the annual average 10-year Treasury 81 
Constant Maturity rates for now and the 1910s–1920s are significantly lower than in the late 1970s to 82 
early 1980s (FRS, 2017), which offers more management options for most agricultural producers and 83 
agribusinesses to weather the current downturn. 84 
       In the next section, we closely examine several key sector-wide economic and regulatory statistics 85 
underlying the golden eras and farm downturns, and then investigate and showcase how a changing 86 
agricultural economy impacted individual producers using three case studies of farmer households. 87 
Finally, we evaluate how future land market and monetary policy changes might impact the trajectory of 88 
the current farm downturn using the 2000s case study.  89 
Are We Going to See a Replay of 1920s or 1980s Farm Crises? 90 
In this section, we discuss several critical aspects of today’s agricultural economy by comparing the 91 
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current downturn with the 1920s and 1980s farm crises. We group the discussions into two categories: 92 
economic considerations, including discussions on farm income and interest rates; and, regulatory and 93 
institutional considerations, such as lending regulations, shifts in underwriting practices, and sources of 94 
agricultural credit. 95 
Economic Considerations  96 
Much stronger, real income growth before the current downturn 97 
<Insert Figure 1> 98 
Table 1 presents the average annual percentage change in nominal and inflation-adjusted Iowa land 99 
values, as well as U.S. gross and net farm income for the three golden eras and farm downturns. These 100 
data series were based on USDA NASS Land Value and Cash Rent Survey (USDA-NASS 2017) as well 101 
as the USDA ERS Farm Income Forecast (USDA ERS, 2017), and we used the annual average consumer 102 
price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as the deflator to derive inflation-adjusted values (US BLS, 103 
2017). In addition, Figure 1 further shows the trajectory of inflation-adjusted Iowa Land Values and U.S. 104 
net farm income over the past century, with these three golden eras and farm downturns highlighted. 105 
While it is concerning to see that since 2013 gross and net cash income has decreased 4.5% and 9.8% per 106 
year, respectively, it is equally important to note that from 2003 to 2013, gross and net income 107 
consistently grew 4.5% and 8.1% every year, reaching almost record-high levels in both farm income and 108 
land values. In particular, the forecasted income for August 2017 by USDA-Economic Research Service 109 
seems to suggest that farm income is stabilizing in Corn Belt states like Iowa. 110 
<Insert Table 1> 111 
        A comparison between this third golden era and the two previous reveal that farmers accumulated 112 
much more income during the most recent decade than during the 1910s and 1970s. Inflation-adjusted net 113 
farm income growth before the 1980s farm crisis was negative, even though nominal farm income and 114 
land values skyrocketed during the same time. Preceding the 1980s crisis, the U.S. economy experienced 115 
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high inflation due to government financing of the Vietnam War and President Johnson’s “War on 116 
Poverty” (Harl, 1990; FDIC, 1995). In particular, Dr. Neil Harl described the gains in gross farm income 117 
and land value as “illusionary” and driven by inflation (Harl, 1990). In contrast, high commodity prices 118 
and increasing net farm income in the 2000s seem to have positioned current agricultural producers to 119 
better withstand the current headwinds. The trajectory of farm income for the most recent run-up and 120 
farm downturn resembles that of the 1910s–1930s more than the 1980s farm crisis. In particular, the 121 
inflation-adjusted net farm income rose in the boom periods before the 1920s farm crisis and the current 122 
downturn; however, the high inflation resulted in declines in real net farm income despite growth in 123 
nominal terms. In addition, the inflation-adjusted net farm income during the 1980s farm crisis increased 124 
as opposed to decreased, partially due to substantial government support (Harl, 1990; Sumner et al., 125 
2010).  126 
Historically low interest rates 127 
Put simply, land value is the net present value of all discounted future income flows. With certain 128 
assumptions imposed, one could think of land value being net income divided by interest (discount) rate. 129 
Despite recent decisions by the Federal Reserve to raise the federal funds rate by a total of 75 basis 130 
points, current interest rates remain at historically low levels (FRS, 2017). The one-year Treasury 131 
Constant Maturity Rate was around 3–7% during the 1910s and 1920s, jumped to 15–20% during the 132 
early 1980s, and is now around 1.2% (FRS, 2017). Farmland mortgage rates resemble this trend as well. 133 
So the interest situation much more closely resembles that of the 1920s more than the 1980s. 134 
        Low interest rates are favorable to keep the farmland market afloat: on the one hand, it encourages 135 
stronger loan demand due to lower interest payments, and on the other hand, low interest rates signal that 136 
the returns on other competing assets, such as stocks and bonds, aren’t as appealing thus a higher investor 137 
demand for farmland (Zhang and Duffy, 2016). Even with recent hikes, interest rates are still very low 138 
compared to the 1980s and only modestly lower than the rates in the 1920s, and the Federal Reserve is 139 
likely to raise the interest rate at a slow pace, as opposed to a sudden hike, which makes loan restructuring 140 
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possible. 141 
        The different interest rate environment has important implications on agricultural producers’ debt 142 
repayment capacity and working capital. Due to abnormally high interest rates in the 1980s, the mortgage 143 
payment for a typical farmland loan was almost three times higher than the typical cash rent, and 144 
extending the farmland loan repayment schedules from 15 to 30 years did almost nothing to alleviate the 145 
financial burden faced by landowners (Zhang, 2017). This eventually led to massive foreclosures, 146 
bankruptcies, suicides, and even the killing of a Hills Bank lender (Atkinson, 1999). However, under 147 
today’s low interest rate environment, debt restructuring is feasible and makes sense. With current 148 
prevailing farmland loan rates similar to 1920s rates, extending a farmland loan from a 15- to 30-year 149 
repayment schedule would cut the annual mortgage payment needed from over $350/acre—higher than 150 
the 2016 cash rent payment of $230/acre—to a level comparable to the typical cash rent payment. In fact, 151 
many lenders are now advising their clients to take advantage of the current favorable interest rates to 152 
secure repayment capacity (ABA, 2017). Although it is difficult to rule out a future sudden change in 153 
interest rates, it is safe to say that at least for the foreseeable future, producers who are currently over-154 
leveraged still potentially have the option to take advantage of the low interest rates.  155 
Regulatory and Institutional Considerations  156 
The current farm credit landscape is markedly different from that which existed than in either the 1920s or 157 
and the 1980s. The current environment is more highly regulated, lenders employ more stringent 158 
underwriting practices, and banks are subject to increased capitalization requirements. 159 
Shift to More Diversified Institutional Lenders 160 
In 1920, private individuals held 70% of farmland mortgage debt (Dyson, 1971). In 1980, private investors 161 
still held 31% of farmland debt, second only to Farm Credit Services (FCS). By 2016, however, that share 162 
had shrunk to only 5.6% (USDA ERS, 2017). Most farmland loans are now made by the Farm Credit 163 
System (FCS) (46.2% in 2016) and commercial banks (37.6% in 2016) (USDA ERS, 2017). Commercial 164 
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banks held only 13% of farmland loans in 1920 and 9% in 1980 (USDA ERS, 1985). Commercial banks 165 
did, however, hold 40% of non-real estate farm debt in 1980 (FDIC, 1995). The shift to institutional 166 
farmland lending has accompanied an increase in regulations governing these entities. The period between 167 
1980 and 1994 saw more legislative and regulatory change affecting the financial services industry than 168 
any other since the 1930s (FDIC, 1995). 169 
       Additionally, as commercial banks have increased their farmland lending activity, they have continued 170 
to consolidate. The FDIC defines an institution as an “agricultural bank” or “farm bank” if at least 25% of 171 
its total outstanding loan volume was made to agriculture (FDIC, 2017a). In September 2017, 1,421 172 
institutions met this definition (FDIC, 2017b), compared to 4,316 agricultural banks in 1980 (FDIC, 1995). 173 
This consolidation of lending institutions has generally created larger banks with more diversified loan 174 
portfolios. This risk diversification, coupled with the emergence of Farmer Mac as a guarantor of many 175 
farm loans (FAMC, 2017), suggests that a downturn in agriculture today may be less likely than during 176 
prior decades to trigger the widespread collapse of large numbers of financial institutions. However, the 177 
number of farm banks has been declining more slowly than the number of non-farm banks (FCA, 2016); 178 
and, one-third of an average farm bank’s loan portfolio in 2016 comprised agricultural loans (ABA, 2017). 179 
As such, modern agricultural banks remain at risk when the farm economy suffers a downturn (FCA, 180 
2016).  181 
More Stringent Underwriting Practices 182 
Regulatory authorities have, since the early 1980s, tightened requirements for loan underwriting. 183 
Agricultural lenders have also embraced more conservative lending policies (FRS, 2015). Despite many 184 
commercial lenders easing underwriting standards during the early 2000s, agricultural lenders did not 185 
generally follow suit (OCC, 2017a). These more conservative practices continued even as crop prices and 186 
land values rose (FRB M, 2013).  187 
9 
 
       Helping to set the stage for the 1980s crisis, the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (Pub.L. 92-181, December 188 
10, 1971) increased the allowable loan-to-value ratio for FCS association loans from 55% to 85% for 189 
standard real estate loans and to 97% of the appraised value for real estate loans guaranteed by the 190 
government. Legislators deemed this a “prudent relaxation” of then-current restrictions (U.S. Congress, 191 
1971). During the 1970s, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) emerged as a prominent lender, 192 
providing government-subsidized operating and farmland loans to family-sized farmers unable to obtain 193 
credit through other channels (Massey, 1994). The ready availability of easy credit drove land prices even 194 
higher (USDA ERS, 1985), which allowed farmers to use their inflated land value as collateral to obtain 195 
more loans and expand their operations (FDIC, 1995, p. 263).  196 
        Most significantly, lenders during this era frequently based their lending decisions on the current 197 
inflated market value of collateral and the current crop prices, rather than on cash-flow analysis (FDIC, 198 
1995, p. 263). This meant lower down payments and a growth of credit availability that exceeded even 199 
quickly rising income levels. Farm debt rose steadily with land prices, and when the bubble burst in the 200 
early 1980s, most mortgage debtors were vastly over-extended. By mid-1985, FCS’s federal land banks 201 
and FmHA held 52.3% of outstanding farm real estate debt (FDIC, 1995, p. 276). Unlike during the 1970s 202 
and early 1980s, regulators now require agricultural lenders to rely on cash flow, not collateral value, in 203 
assessing loan eligibility (OCC, 2017b). Consequently, banks do not generally make farm loans for real 204 
estate with loan-to-value ratios greater than 60%–70% (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009). All FDIC-205 
insured institutions must abide by federal regulations that require “prudent underwriting standards” (12 206 
C.F.R. §365.2). Additionally, federal banks are supervised by bank examiners from the Office of the 207 
Comptroller of the Currency, which requires its banks to mitigate risk, guard against an overconcentration 208 
of agriculture-related loans, and use prudent underwriting practices (OCC, 2017a). These regulations set 209 
fundamental limits on lending activities, such as requiring loan-to-value ratios no greater than 85% for 210 
loans to purchase improved property, such as farmland (12 C.F.R. §365.2). 211 
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        In particular, the OCC handbook states, with respect to underwriting agricultural loans, that the value 212 
of collateral should be calculated based on expected, multi-year-average operating cash flow as opposed to 213 
market value, which is subject to stronger influences of inflation and speculation: 214 
“There should be a strong emphasis on borrower cash flow and repayment capacity. Ag banks 215 
should not place undue reliance on collateral and cyclical factors as part of underwriting 216 
decisions…an Ag loan approval should be based on a reasonable expectation that operating cash 217 
flow will provide sufficient repayment, not on the Ag land value. (OCC, 2017b).” 218 
        Likewise, FCS’s lending requirements have become more stringent since the 1980s farm crisis. 219 
Although regulations still allow FCS to lend up to 85% of the appraised value of real estate, the standard 220 
practice is 50% loan-to-value ratio (FCSA, 2016). Like other lenders, FCS focuses on cash flow and 221 
repayment capacity, as opposed to current collateral value. The FCA Loan Portfolio Management 222 
Handbook includes a section on “Lessons from the Past” warning against “over-reliance on inflated 223 
expectations for future incomes combined with rapidly increasing values for agricultural assets” (FCA, 224 
2017). 225 
Increased Capitalization Requirements 226 
Regulations designed to strengthen the capitalization requirements for lending institutions also protect 227 
against the collapse of agricultural lending institutions. Prior to the 1980s, federal regulators did not set 228 
specific numerical requirements for the capital adequacy of banks (FDIC, 2003). These determinations 229 
were left to the discretion of bank supervisors (FDIC, 2003). In 1988, in response to the International Basel 230 
Committee on Bank Supervision’s first Basel Accord (FRS, 2003), federal regulators imposed new capital 231 
adequacy standards upon banking institutions. This capital had to consist primarily of “Tier 1” or low-risk 232 
capital. In contrast, the agricultural banks that failed in the 1980s tended to have more high-risk capital and 233 
fewer low-risk assets such as federal government securities (Belongia and Gilbert, 1987).      234 
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       Current FDIC regulations incorporate guidance from Basel III. All FDIC-insured lending institutions, 235 
state and federal, must have a total capital to total risk-weighted assets ratio of at least 8% (FDIC, 2003). 236 
Of that, the ratio for common equity tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets ratio must be 4.5%. Basel III 237 
also instituted a new “capital conservation buffer,” to strengthen financial resilience during economic 238 
cycles. Beginning in 2016, this minimum requirement increases until reaching 2.5% in 2019 (12 C.F.R. § 239 
324.300). In response, farm banks have significantly increased high quality capital reserves during the 240 
past several decades, providing them with more insulation to survive potential downturns in the 241 
agricultural economy (ABA, 2017).  242 
“Farming in Our Blood”: Case Studies of Farmers Who Lived Through the Downturn 243 
While the previous section focused on aggregate economic and regulatory considerations, this section 244 
illustrates how the golden eras and farm downturns were manifested at the individual producer level using 245 
three representative case studies. 246 
Farmer A – 1920s 247 
Farmer A is largely borrowed from Murray (1967). He owned a 311-acre farm in 1919 in central Iowa on 248 
which he owed a mortgage debt of $11,000. Up to this time, he had resisted all temptations to buy during 249 
the boom. He had seen the farm next to his sell four times between 1909 and 1917—at $100 an acre in 250 
1909 and at $190 an acre in 1917. Demand for food in Europe after World War I--especially a large U.S. 251 
food aid program--further drove up crop and land prices, as well as net farm income. Finally in March of 252 
1920, at the top of the boom, courthouse records show that Farmer A bought the neighboring farm of 240 253 
acres at $396 an acre for a total of $95,000. 254 
       To make the purchase, Farmer A borrowed $34,000 in cash by increasing the mortgage on his home 255 
farm from $11,000 to $45,000. This $34,000, plus $16,000 of additional cash from deposits and bank 256 
loans on livestock and equipment, totalled $50,000, which was paid on the $95,000 purchase, leaving 257 
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only $45,000 to be financed. Compared to most of the land boom sales, this one was conservative with 258 
more than 50% of the amount paid in cash (Murray, 1967; Rajan and Ramcharan, 2015). 259 
       Farmer A's new mortgage debt was not heavy in relation to the value of the farm. He had a mortgage 260 
of $45,000 on each farm for a total of $90,000 in debt on 551 acres, or an average of $163 an acre. With 261 
land valued at around $400 an acre, his debt was considerably less than one-half of the land value. 262 
       The first blow, which came in 1921, was the drop in prices of farm products (Shideler, 1957). Corn, 263 
which had been averaging over $1.00/bushel and actually selling for $2.00/bushel in the summer of 1919, 264 
plunged to $.41/bushel in 1921 (Johanns, 2017). The boom was definitely over.  265 
       The second blow was the interest payment on the mortgage debt, which hit like a "ton of bricks" in 266 
1921. In the actual case of Farmer A with a $90,000 mortgage debt, the required interest payment of 267 
$5,000 was more than the value of all the corn produced on both of his farms that year (Murray, 1967). 268 
While the interest payments were large for the time, the interest rates were much lower than comparable 269 
rates for the 1980s, but only modestly higher than today’s rates (FRS, 2017). Some farm owners 270 
borrowed money from banks, relatives, and any other sources available to meet their required payments, 271 
hoping that next year would see corn above $1.00/bushel. That never happened, as the average corn price 272 
for 1921–1925 was only $.63/bushel (Johanns, 2017; Murray, 1967). Although farmer A had paid over 273 
half of the purchase price in cash, he lost both of his farms in 1927 and 1928 because he exhausted his 274 
borrowing capacity to stave off farm foreclosures. Farmer A was typical of a particularly unfortunate 275 
group of land boom victims who had invested a large amount of their own resources, only to see them 276 
evaporate with the continued low level of corn-hog prices after 1920 (Murray, 1967). 277 
Farmer B – 1970s- 1980s 278 
Combined testimonies of farm families from Minnesota and Iowa form the basis for the creation of 279 
“Farmer B.” These testimonies were documented in a book called Farming is in Our Blood with 280 
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extensive interviews of 43 Minnesota farmers (Rosenblatt, 1990) and a documentary The Farm Crisis 281 
showcasing multiple Iowa farmer families (IPTV, 2013).  282 
       Farmer B started farming in the mid-1970s in Fayette County in Northeast Iowa, renting 500 acres to 283 
grow corn and soybeans. He also inherited 160 acres, which he owned free and clear, from his 284 
grandfather. After accumulating income for a few years, and inspired by the skyrocketing commodity and 285 
land prices that began in 1973 (Zhang, 2017), Farmer B wanted to further expand his operation. With the 286 
encouragement of lenders, he bought 320 acres in 1978 at an auction for $1,650 an acre.  287 
       After paying slightly more than 20% as a down payment for the 320 acres, Farmer B obtained two 288 
land loans. One loan was a 10-year farmland mortgage of $150,000 with 10% fixed interest obtained from 289 
a local community bank, while the other was a 15-year variable rate loan of $250,000 from a local Federal 290 
Land Bank (FLB). The interest rate was fixed for the first three years at 9%, and then adjustable to 291 
prevailing market rates. In addition, Farmer B had a five-year machinery loan of $50,000 initiated in 1977 292 
and an annual $30,000 operating loan with a floating interest rate from PCA.  293 
       When Farmer B obtained these farmland loans, he had every intention to make timely and regular 294 
payments. In 1978, his crop income was more than double the annual mortgage payments needed for the 295 
land loans, and he saw the collateral value on his balance sheet and his net-worth on the bank statements 296 
skyrocket.  297 
       Things turned ugly for Farmer B in the early 1980s after the Soviet Union grain export embargo. In 298 
addition, crude oil prices had doubled in 1979, and the cost of fertilizer, seed and farm chemicals rose by 299 
20% (Rosenblatt, 1990; USDA ERS, 2016). More importantly, the Federal Reserve Bank determined that 300 
higher interest rate were needed to stem inflation, which was around 10%–12% in late 1970s due to 301 
government financing of the Vietnam War and the “War on Poverty” (Harl, 1990). With a strong U.S. 302 
dollar hurting U.S. agricultural exports, the prices of corn, soybeans, and wheat received by Farmer B 303 
dropped significantly below his cost of production, and his farm income dropped precipitously.  304 
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       Like his neighbors, Farmer B sensed the tightening agricultural profitability but still thought his 305 
balance sheet was strong. In 1983, he had about $1,000/acre unpaid for the two land loans, and high 306 
interest rates started to take a significant toll. After a disastrous 1983 harvest, Farmer B was still current 307 
on his debt payments for the machinery, land, and operating loans. However, his working capital quickly 308 
shrank to less than $25,000. The cost of production and grain prices were not that different (Johanns, 309 
2017), but interest rates almost doubled from 9% to 17% (FRS, 2017). 310 
       In February 1984, Farmer B was called in to the FLB, and the bank officer told him they needed 311 
$50,000 more in collateral for loan security purposes. Farmer B was caught by surprise and at a loss as to 312 
how he could work through this. Neither FLB nor PCA was able to offer loan restructuring or a reduction 313 
in the interest rate.  314 
       In addition, the PCA sought additional collateral and could not offer additional operating loans. 315 
Farmer B finally went to FmHA and got a $20,000 operating loan at a 15% interest rate. Farmer B 316 
struggled through the 1984 crop season, but saw in early 1985 another 30% decline in the value of his 500 317 
acres. All proceeds went to the bank to pay interest and almost none went toward principal. With the 318 
additional reduction in collateral value, the FLB called in its loan. Farmer B was unable to refinance, and 319 
his farm, including the 160 acres he inherited in the 1970s, went to farm auction a year later, putting 320 
Farmer B out of the farming business. 321 
Farmer C - 2010s 322 
Farmer C is based on FINPACK data (FINPACK, 2017) collected by Charles Brown, an Iowa State 323 
University Extension and Outreach farm management specialist. Farmer C farms 1,223 acres in Freeborn 324 
County, Minnesota. He rented 1,000 acres for $257/acre in 2015 and owned 223 acres, which he 325 
purchased in 2005. On the rented acres, he employed a 50/50 corn-soybean rotation, while growing 326 
continuous corn on his own 223 acres.  327 
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       Farmer C’s major source of income stems from his corn and soybean crops. Because of accumulated 328 
savings from the late 2000s, he had $200,000 in cash and $113,969 prepaid expenses and supplies 329 
associated with an annual operating loan before the 2015 planting season. He owns his large equipment 330 
(i.e., tractor and combine). With land values increasing to close to $8,000/acre in early 2015, his total 331 
asset value was above $3 million as of January 2015. In terms of liabilities, Farmer C has a 20-year land 332 
mortgage with a $301,145 remaining balance and a fixed 5% interest rate, and a five-year combine and 333 
tractor note in the amount of $300,000 with a fixed 5% interest rate and final payment due in late 2019. In 334 
sum, Farmer C had a strong balance sheet, with a 24.3% debt-to-asset ratio, as well as a 2.26 current ratio, 335 
with $272,886 of working capital in January 2015.  336 
       In 2015, Farmer C had decent yields, 180 bushels/acre for corn and 55 bushels/acre for soybeans, and 337 
good prices, $3.90/bushel for corn and $10.00/bushel for soybeans, but not as good as in previous years. 338 
He did not change his operation, and due to high production costs, including the $257/acre cash rent, he 339 
saved only $42,255 net cash farm income. With high mortgage payments for the machinery and land 340 
loans, he incurred a negative capital replacement margin of $94,146. If Farmer C had cut production 341 
expenses by $50/acre or negotiated to get a reduction in the cash rent, he could have improved 342 
profitability significantly. Alternatively, he could have refinanced the machinery and land loans to a 343 
longer term and locked in the current, low interest rates. This option would not improve profitability, but 344 
would buy more time and slow the erosion of working capital.  345 
       Because Farmer C made no changes in his operation for the 2015 growing season, he saw more 346 
erosion in his working capital, and a $94,146 loss in cash available after loan payments. In addition, the 347 
value of Farmer C’s land dropped from $8,000 to $7,000 an acre a year later.  348 
       For the 2016 growing season, Farmer C achieved much better yields than expected—210 349 
bushels/acre for corn and 65 bushels/acre for soybeans—but prices were lower than 2015 at $3.40/bushel 350 
for corn and $8.75/bushel for soybeans. Cash rent for the 1,000 rented acres was reduced by $50 to 351 
$225/acre, and input costs, especially fertilizer costs, were reduced from 2015 prices as well. There was a 352 
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continued erosion of working capital, falling from $272,886 in early 2015 to $159,557 in late 2016 (Table 353 
2). Despite declining land values leading to a reduction in the value of long-term assets, Farmer C’s debt-354 
to-asset ratio is comparable to or even smaller than two years ago at 23.7%. This is because he paid down 355 
a significant amount of debt, especially the machinery debt, over the prior two years. The inaction of 356 
Farmer C to refinance, however, resulted in a negative capital debt repayment margin of -$25,032, and his 357 
term debt coverage ratio dropped to 1.07, well below the safe threshold of 1.75 (Table 3) (CFFM, 2017). 358 
Summary of the Farmer Case Studies 359 
There are some common themes for the three farmer case studies presented above, featured by declining 360 
farm incomes, rising mortgage payments and erosion of working capital and borrowing capacity. 361 
However, there were also important differences for the experiences of farmers A, B and C: For Farmers A 362 
and C, deteriorating farm income due to reduction in commodity prices and low-to-negative profit 363 
margins gradually drained their working capital and resulted in a slow erosion of their capital debt 364 
repayment capacity. Both their net farm income saw an increase in the boom period and then declined 365 
significantly in the following downturn years. In contrast, while Farmer B was hit by declining farm 366 
income, the extremely high interest rates was a major, if not more important, factor as well (Harl, 1990; 367 
FRS, 2017). The high interest rates led to high interest payments, which resulted in a much faster erosion 368 
of Farmer B’s debt capital repayment capacity compared to Farmers A and C. Had Farmer B stayed 369 
solvent with his farming operation in the late 1980s, he would have actually seen a rebound of the net 370 
farm income largely due to substantial support from government programs to combat the 1980s farm 371 
crisis. 372 
Looking Ahead: the Trajectory of the Current Farm Downturn 373 
As shown in the previous section, our representative case study farmer - Farmer C still has an excellent 374 
balance sheet, yet his working capital is quickly draining away. Tables 2 and 3 showcase how his balance 375 
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sheet, working capital, and capital debt repayment capacity would change under several alternative future 376 
scenarios, including changes in interest rates and land values for 2018.  377 
No Changes 378 
Farmer C has not refinanced, and with potential risk for drought, yields are back to normal in 2017—180 379 
bushels/acre for corn and 55 bushels/acre for soybeans. He began 2017 with $159,557 of working capital. 380 
He still has a healthy current ratio and has managed to pay off a substantial portion of his machinery 381 
loans. In this scenario, we assume that he did not refinance nor lower his production costs, but his cash 382 
rent for 1,000 rented acres dropped another $10 to $215/acre.  383 
       For 2018, we also hypothesize business as usual. Grain prices have slightly improved, pushing corn 384 
prices to $3.50/bushel and soybeans to $9.00/bushel. We also hypothesize a minor reduction in land 385 
value, down from $6,500/acre a year ago to $6,250/acre in 2018. Due to the loss in capital debt repayment 386 
margin in 2017, Farmer C cannot pay it all using the cash on hand and he will have to sell $10,000 in 387 
additional bushels of corn inventory to have more cash on hand, yet his working capital still shrinks by 388 
less than $10,000. However, because the farm still has an excellent balance sheet and the value of his 389 
collateral still significantly outweighs his debt obligations, there is no risk of default.  390 
Interest Rate Hike 391 
First, we assume for purposes of this scenario that Farmer C, who actually has fixed-rate machinery and 392 
land loans, has variable rate loans with a rate that has increased to 8%, which would be close to the high 393 
rates in the 1920s but only half of the 1980s rates (FRS, 2017). We also assume that the capitalization rate 394 
for land valuation rises from 3% to 5% due to higher interest rates. Table 2 shows that an increase in the 395 
capitalization rate would lead to a steep reduction in land value to $3,900/acre. Despite this decline, 396 
Farmer C would still have a strong balance sheet; however, his debt-to-asset ratio would rise to almost 397 
27%, and, more importantly, Table 3 shows that his total interest paid would almost double, lowering his 398 
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capital debt repayment capacity by close to $100,000. Under those conditions, cost management and 399 
improved marketing would be imperative for Farmer C. 400 
Land Value Reduction 401 
Another possible scenario is the substantial and sudden reduction in land value, specifically another 30% 402 
reduction from 2017 due to continued stagnation in commodity prices and farm income, while the interest 403 
rate remains flat at around 5%. Continued negative cash income leads to more debt and lower asset 404 
values. Tables 2 and 3 show that a reduction in land value lowers Farmer C’s total farm asset value, but 405 
does not necessarily change the profitability of production, unless the loan officer requests additional cash 406 
as security. His capital debt repayment capacity as a result incurs an additional loss of about $10,000 407 
compared to the baseline. 408 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 409 
In this article, we provide a timely general review that examines the current farm economic downturn 410 
through cross-era comparisons of both economic, regulatory and institutional factors. While we lack 411 
micro-level data to elicit causal comparison between these three eras, we make use of both aggregate 412 
sector wide statistics and three representative farmer case studies in this general review. Essentially, we 413 
argue that despite the deteriorating agricultural financial conditions and continued decline in farm income, 414 
the current farm downturn is more likely a liquidity and working capital problem, as opposed to a 415 
solvency and balance sheet problem for the entire agricultural sector. 416 
       We argue that there are at least three economic and regulatory reasons why this farm downturn is 417 
unlikely to slide into a sudden collapse. First, a comparison between the third golden era of the 2000s and 418 
the previous two reveals that gross and net farm income growth was much stronger during the most recent 419 
decade. Second, regulators and agricultural lenders have tightened underwriting standards, including 420 
valuing collateral based on cash flow as opposed to inflated market value (OCC, 2017b), and 421 
strengthened capitalization requirements. Third, despite recent moves by the Federal Reserve, farmers and 422 
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other agricultural businesses still enjoy a very low interest rate, which limits the amount of debt in the 423 
agricultural sector and keeps asset values strong. To this day, the balance sheet of the U.S. farm sector is 424 
still very strong, and the delinquency rates for agricultural loans are still fairly low.  425 
       From the perspective of Farmer C, our representative case study farmer for the current period, he has 426 
an excellent balance sheet, even after several years of low-to-negative-profit production years. Farmers 427 
like him were able to make loan payments on time, but saw a significant reduction in their working 428 
capital. However, in contrast with producers in the 1980s, most farmers today are in a much better 429 
financial position going into the downturn, do not have substantial land or operating debt, and can still 430 
take advantage of low interest rates in securing loans, as well as refinancing. Likewise, today’s 431 
agricultural lenders protect clients from becoming overextended, requiring them to demonstrate 432 
repayment capacity, based upon cash flow, as a condition of receiving additional credit. In the era of low-433 
to-negative margins, cost management and better marketing would help current farmers slow down or 434 
prevent working capital erosion. 435 
       Finally, we argue that we are likely experiencing a gradual, drawn-out downward adjustment to the 436 
historical normal return levels for the agricultural economy, rather than an abrupt farm crisis. This is 437 
likely a result of several factors, including the strong balance sheet still enjoyed by some producers, the 438 
likely slow upward adjustment in interest rates, as opposed to abrupt hikes, and improving commodity 439 
prices through slow acreage reduction in the U.S. and beyond. If one has to predict future farmland 440 
market movement, it is likely under additional downward pressure as a small portion of producers will be 441 
forced to liquidate some of their assets. It is, however, more likely a gradual, drawn-out trajectory like 442 
that of the 1920s–1930s as opposed to the sudden collapse of the mid-1980s or the global economic 443 
collapse of the 1930s Great Depression. While this current downturn will no doubt force some producers 444 
to leave farming, we suggest that it will not lead to a sector-wise collapse or exodus like those of the prior 445 
eras.   446 
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Figures 574 
Figure 1. Inflation-adjusted Iowa land values and U.S. net farm income (1910 = 100). 575 
  576 
  577 
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Table 1. Average Annual Percentage Change in Nominal and Inflation-adjusted Iowa Land Values and 578 
U.S. Farm Income 579 
 580 
Note: Iowa state average land values are based on USDA Census of Agriculture and USDA NASS 581 
Land Value and Cash Rent Survey (USDA NASS, 2017), while the data on U.S. gross and net farm 582 
income is from the USDA Economic Research Service Farm Income and Wealth Statistics database 583 
(USDA ERS, 2017). 584 
 585 
 586 
 587 
Average annual percent change in nominal values 
Golden Eras Iowa Land U.S. Gross Income U.S. Net Income 
1910-1920         9.3%         9.0%      8.4% 
1973-1981       19.5%                   9.8%      5.3% 
2003-2013       13.7%         7.1%     10.7% 
     Crises and Declines Iowa Land U.S. Gross Income U.S. Net Income 
1921-1933        -8.9%        -4.7%     -3.6% 
1981-1987       -14.0%         2.1%      7.3% 
2013-2017          1.1%        -2.4%     -6.4% 
Average annual percent change in inflation-adjusted values 
Golden Eras Iowa Land U.S. Gross Income U.S. Net Income 
1910-1920 1.7% 1.1% 0.5% 
1973-1981 9.6% 0.7% -3.4% 
2003-2013 11.0% 4.5% 8.2% 
Crises and Declines Iowa Land U.S. Gross Income U.S. Net Income 
1921-1933 -5.8% -2.0% -1.3% 
1981-1987 -15.0% -2.4% 2.7% 
2013-2017 -0.1% -3.7% -7.6% 
28 
 
Table 2. Farmer C’s Current and Future Projected Balance Sheet for 2018 
  December 2016 
December 2017 
Base  
December 2018 
Base (sold 10,000 
bushels soybean in 
inventory) 
If Farmer C pays 8% 
interest (cap rate is 
5%) – December 
2018 
Land value drops 
another 30% - 
December 2018 
Current farm assets $        377,090 $        291,237 $       227,918 $        194,896 $        205,432 
     Cash on hand $        107,443 $         21,570 $         46,011 $           12,989 $         23,525 
Intermediate farm assets $        427,050  $       375,850 $        329,395 $        329,395 $        329,395 
Long-term farm assets $    1,636,000 $    1,524,500 $    1,463,750 $       941,094 $    1,045,625 
     Value of Owned land $   1,561,000 $    1,449,500 $   1,393,750 $      871,094 $      975,625 
Total assets $    2,440,140 $    2,191,587 $    2,021,063 $    1,465,385 $    1,580,452 
      
Current farm liabilities $        217,533 $        219,128 $        218,084 $        218,084 $        218,084 
Intermediate farm liabilities $        131,179 $         67,196 $            4,198 $            4,198 $            4,198 
Long-term farm liabilities $        228,752 $        201,514 $        177,347 $        177,347 $        177,347 
Total liabilities $        577,464 $        487,838 $        399,629 $        399,629 $        399,629 
      
Net worth $      1,862,676 $      1,703,749 $      1,621,434 $      1,065,756 $      1,220,494 
   
 
  
Liquidity   
 
  
     Current ratio 1.73 1.33 1.05 0.89 0.94 
     Working capital $        159,557 $        72,109 $          9,834 -$         23,188 -$         12,652 
    Working capital to gross farm 
income 19.2% 10.7% 1.4% -3.3% -1.8% 
   
 
  
Solvency   
 
  
      Farm debt to asset ratio 23.7% 22.3% 19.8% 27.3% 25.3% 
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Table 3. Farmer C’s Current and Future Projected Budget and Capital Debt Repayment Capacity 
 2016 Crop Year 2017 Crop Year 
2018 Crop Year 
Baseline 
If Farmer C has 
pay 8% interest 
(cap rate = 5%) 
– 2018 Crop 
Year 
Land value 
drops another 
30% - 2018 
Crop Year 
Crop income $  800,597 $  676,226 $   702,990 $   702,990 $   702,990 
Crop insurance indemnity $            0 $              0 $              0 $              0 $              0 
Commodity payments $   32,535 $              0 $              0 $              0 $              0 
Gross farm income $ 833,132 $  676,226 $   702,990 $   702,990 $   702,990 
Interest paid $   31,577 $    26,965 $     24,469 $     44,521 $     24,469 
Net farm income $  117,660 $     15,966 $    48,718 $     28,666 $    48,718 
Depreciation $   51,200 $    46,455 $    42,700 $    42,700 $    42,700 
Nonfarm income      
Family living $   56,000 $    56,000 $    56,000 $    56,000 $    56,000 
Income taxes $   19,977 $      2,256 $      9,060 $      4,368 $      2,040 
Interest on term debt $   23,668 $    19,504 $    17,625 $    19,521 $    17,625 
      
Capital debt repayment capacity $  116,551 $    23,669 $    43,983 $    30,519 $     51,003 
Total scheduled principal and interest $ 109,048 $  109,542 $  109,542 $  129,100 $  109,542 
Capital debt repayment margin $     7,503 -$   85,873 -$   65,559 -$   98,581 -$   58,045 
      
Cash required for replacement      
Replacement margin $     7,503 -$   85,873 -$   65,559 -$   98,581 -$   58,045 
      
Term debt coverage ratio 1.07 0.22 0.40 0.24 0.47 
 
